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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
Case No. 18288 
BARBARA BRUNDAGE, RAY H. IVIE, 
and J. RULON MORGAN, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Respondent adopts the statement of the case set forth in 
Brief of Appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff-Respondent adopts the outline set forth in Brief of Apell-
lant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmation of the holding of the lower 
court and seeks specific ruling by this court ~hat the Arbitration Committee 
to which Allstate must submit, be bound by the ruling of the lower court and that 
Appellant Allstate is not entitled to equitable reimbursement from Brundage and 
her attorneys and that Appellant Allstate must submit to inter-company arbitra-
tion for the sole purpose of determining liability of the respective insurance 
company's drivers and the amount of personal injury protection payments and 
reimbursement thereof. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiff-Respondent.The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company controverts 
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the Statement of the Facts set forth by Defendant-Appellant Allstate Insurance 
Company in the following respects: 
At least a year and two months prior to the tort trial of the Brundage 
vs. Kernan case, Ohio Casualty had placed Allstate on notice of its subrogated 
interest and had demanded return of the PIP payment made to Mrs. Brundage pursuant 
to the provisions of Section 31-41-11 U.C.A. 1953 (as amended) (R.109). Continued 
demands were made through the following year. (R. 110-116). A formal arbitration 
demand was made September 9, 1977 (R. 179). Ohio Casualty also specifically in-
formed Brundage's attorney verbally and by letter September 9, 1977 that he was 
not to represent Ohio Casualty with respect to the reimbursement of said PIP 
payments in view of the fact that Ohio Casualty was statutorily entitled to seek 
direct reimbursement from Allstate. (R. 11). Notwithstanding this, at the 
conclusion of the trial of Brundage vs. Kernan on September 14, 1977, Allstate's 
attorney and Brundage's attorney joined in a motion that the sums representing 
Ohio Casualty's PIP payments be paid to Mrs. Brundage and her attorneys instead 
of being remitted from the judgment, thus giving Mrs. Brundage double recovery 
of her PIP payments and windfall attorney's fees to Rulon Morgan and Ray Ivie, 
Mrs. Brundage's attorneys. (R. 232), (R. 20). This was done despite the fact 
that all parties were on notice of Ohio Casualty's reimbursement demand prior 
to trial of the tort action. Allstate Insurance Company and Brundage therefore 
had the opportunity to allow reimbursement of said monies to be handled pursuant 
to the statutory arbitration provisions. Allstate, nevertheless, joined in the 
aforesaid motion at the conclusion of the trial to pay the amounts representing 
the PIP payments directly to Mrs. Brundage, in contravention of the clear 
statutory language mandating that such amounts be paid directly to the no-
faul t insurer (Ohio Casualty). 
Contrary to Appellant's Statement of the Facts, Ohio Casualty did 
not wait until October 21, 1977 to commence arbitration proceedings. Demands 
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for reimbursement were commenced on July 16, 1976, which demands were acknowledged 
by return mail by Allstate on several occasions. For example, Allstate writes on 
the bottom of Ohio Casualty's letter of July 16, 1976, "We will consider your subro 
as soon as we settle with Attorney Rulon Morgan". (R. 109). Continued demands for 
reimbursement were made before trial of Brundage vs. Kernan. (R. 109-116). Appel-
lant's Statement of the Facts would lead one to believe that Ohio Casualty waited 
until after the trial to begin its demand for reimbursement which is entirely con-
trary to the facts of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT ALLSTATE'S ONLY REMEDY IS SUBMISSION TO INTER-COMPANY 
ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 31-41-11 AND APPELLANT ALLSTATE 
IS TO BE BOUND BY THE RULING OF THE SAID ARBITRATION COMMITTEE 
WITH RESPECT TO LIABILITY AND REIMBURSEMENT OF PIP PAYMENTS. 
The Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act preserves subrogation-like 
rights of reimbursement among no-fault carriers. Section 31-41-11 provides: 
(1) Every insurer authorized to write the insurance 
required by this act shall agree as a condition to being 
allowed to continue to write insurance in the State of Utah: 
(a) That where its insured is or would be held 
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any 
person to whom benefits required under this act have been 
paid by another insurer, including the state insur~nce fund, 
it will reimburse such other insurer for the payment of such 
benefits, but not in excess of the amount of damages so re-
coverable, and 
(b) That the issue of liability for such reimburse-
ment and the amount of same shall be decided by mandatory, 
binding arbitration between the insurers. 
The recent Utah Supreme Court Decision of Allstate v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 
1197 (1980), construed this statue and the rights of subrogation it confers 
upon insurers. The rule of law which emerges from this case is that a no-
fault insurer and its insured have independent remedies in connection with claims 
arising out of automobile accidents. The insured on the one hand, has a right 
of action against the tort-feasor, provided he can satisfy the therehold require-
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ments set out in Section 31-41-2, to recover damages for injuries not ~lready 
compensated through PIP benefits. On the other hand, the no-fault insurer has a 
right to reimbursement from the insurer of a negligent tort-feasor, for PIP benefits 
paid to its insured. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has determined that these remedies are 
mutually exclusive and has further determined that an injured person cannot pro-
perly assert any claim, in a lawsuit or otherwise, against a tort-feasor for 
damages for which he has already received PIP benefits from his insurer. Allstate 
v. Ivie, supra. This is so primarly because the tort-feasor is not liable for 
such. 
There is no prov1s1on in the statutory scheme to 
indicate the tort-feasor who has complied with the 
security provisions of the act, becomes personally 
liable for the PIP benefits provided in Section 6, 
when the injured party is entitled under the thresh-
old provisions of Section 9(1) to maintain a claim 
for personal injuries. In such a situation, the 
injured party should plead only for those damages for 
which he has not received reparation under his first 
party insurance benefits. Allstate v. Ivie, supra at 
page 1200. 
The no-fault insurer, on its part, has no right of subrogation to the 
~unds received by its insured for personal injuries, but rather must look to the 
liablity insurer for reimbursement of funds to which it is entitled under Section 
31-41-ll(l)(a) . 
... Section 11 in the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act cannot 
be interpreted as conferring on the no-fault insurer a 
right of subrogation to the funds received by its insured 
for personal injuries. Section 11 grants the no-fault 
insurer a limited equitable right to seek reimbursement 
in arbitration proceedings against the liability insurer. 
Section 11 cannot be deemed as conferring subrogation rights 
on the no-fault insurer, vis-a-vis, its insured as to his 
recovery in a settlement or legal action. Allstate v. Ivie, 
supra, at page 1202. 
The Supreme Court in Ivie has mandated that the no-fault insurer and 
its insured pursue their separate remedies. (See also Justice Stewart's concur-
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ring opinion). The remedy of the no-fault insurer is to seek reimbursement 
from the liability insurer, and these claims are the subject of mandatory, 
binding arbitration between the insuers. The Ivie case has made it clear that 
Section 31-41-11 is an essential and unavoidable part of the Utah No-Fault 
Insurance Act. See also the recent Utah Supreme Court decision of Allstate 
Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 608 P.2d 235 (1980), and especially the concurring 
opinion of Chief Justice Crockett. 
The facts presented in the Ivie case were different from those pre-
sented here in two important respects. These differences strenghten Respondent 
Ohio Casualty's claim for affirmation of the lower court's ruling. First, the 
parties in Ivie reached a compromise settlement, whereas the defendants in the 
instant case obtained a jury verdict upon submission of special interrogatories. 
Among other things, a specific finding was made concerning the existance and the 
amount of special damages. All parties agree that the amount so found repre-
sents Ohio Casualty's PIP payments. Secondly, and most importanty, Allstate's 
attorney and Brundage's attorney at the time of trial joined in a motion that said 
PIP payments not be remitted from the judgment in favor of Brundage but that they 
be paid to Mrs. Brundage and her attorneys. It is totally irreconcilable that 
Allstate is now asking that the ruling on its own motion be reversed and that 
Brundage be made to pay said payments back to Ohio Casualty. Allstate should 
not now be heard to complain that Brundage " .•. is allowed to keep her double 
recovery" (Appellant Brief p.13). 
All cases decided subsequent to Ivie have decided that the PIP carrier 
has no right of subrogation to amounts obtained by its insured in a tort action 
and must submit to arbitration proceedings between the carriers. For example, in 
Street v. Farmerms Ins. Exch., 609 P.2d 1343 (1980), the insured initiated an 
action against the tort-feasor and then settled with the tort-feasor's liabilty 
carrier. The parties stipulated that specific portions of the proceeds were for 
-5-
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medical expenses, lost wages and loss of services (all PIP benefits). The PIP 
carrier asserted a subrogation right to all the proceeds relating to PIP benefits. 
The Court stated that the PIP carrier had no right of subrogation to these amounts 
because the insurance company's right of subrogation must be excercised in arbitra-
tion proceedings between the insurance companies. In so ruling, the Supreme Court 
in Street v. Farmers explained the holding of Ivie as follows: 
It holds that the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act does not 
contemplate the granting of a right of subrogation to 
a no-fault insurer in an action by the no-fault insured 
against a third-party tort-feasor. The right of subro-
gation, as explained in Ivie, is a right to be exercised 
in an arbitration proceeding between insurance companies 
of the respective parties so that double recovery can be 
avoided, unnecessary litigation made less likely, and the 
inherent conflicts between the insured and the insurer 
avoided. Street v. Farmers Ins. Exch., supra, at page 
1346. 
It is clear pursuant to the facts presented here and the applicable 
law, that Allstate's argument that it will, in effect, have to reimburse PIP pay-
ments twice is no defense to the requirement that Allstate comply with Section 11, 
as demanded by Ohio Casualty. The record clearly shows that Ohio Casualty at all 
times complied with the requirements of Section 31-41-11 taking the only course 
available to it under the statute. Ohio Casulaty had no right to be part of the 
Brundage vs. Kernan action and therefore could not have "protected its interest" 
as has been pointed out by Appellant in other memoranda and briefs. 
Ohio Casualty has, in all respects, acted timely and properly to pre-
serve its rights of subrogation according to the applicable statutory provisions. 
From the very beginning Ohio Casualty recognized that its remedy, its right of 
subrogation, was preserved to it by reason of Section 31-41-11, Utah Code Ann., 
and that this statutory provision allowed Ohio Casualty the procedure of binding 
arbitration whereby it could secure its remedy. Accordingly Ohio Casualty acted 
timely to give notice to Allstate of its subrogation claims and to seek redress 
through the arbitration process. Furthermore, Ohio Casualty notified the attor-
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ney for the insured that he was not to represent the interest of Ohio Casualty 
in the trial of Ohio Casualty's insured against the tort-feasor. 
In other words, Ohio Casualty was astute enough to interpret properly 
the statutory provisions of the Utah No-Fault Act, and did so prior to the decision 
in Ivie. Ohio Casualty should not now be penalized for properly interpreting the 
statute. Appellant Allstate would have the court believe that by reason of the 
mistaken assumptions made by the trial court and the parties to the liability 
action in Brundage vs. Kernan, which assumptions proved wrong with the appearance 
of the decision in Ivie, Ohio Casualty should now be made to suffer. 
POINT II 
IN THE EVENT THAT THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT BRUNDAGE IS LIABLE 
FOR THE RETURN OF SAID PIP PAYMENTS, ATTORNEYS IVIE AND MORGAN 
ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RETAIN ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that in certain narrow circumstances, 
a subrogated insurance carrier must pay its fair share of attorney's fees in connec-
tion with a recovery of funds in an action against a third-party tort-feasor. 
Street v. Farmers Ins. Exch., supra., Guaranty National Insurance Company v. 
Morris, 611 P.2d 725 (1980). As indicated this court has articulated several 
conditions which must be met before the duty to pay attorney's fees arises. 
First, there must be a benefit conferred upon the insurer by reason of 
the handling of the case, and the benefit must have been conferred by reason of 
some mistake. Street v. Farmers Ins. Exch., supra., at page 1346. 
In Street, the plaintiff-insured brought an action against her no-
fault carrier claiming, among other things, that the no-fault insurer should be 
compelled to contribute toward the attorneys fees. Her claim was based on the 
fact that in the trial against the third-party tort-feasor, a recovery was made, 
mistakenly, of the PIP benefits. These funds were "mistakenly" recovered because, 
by reason of Ivie, the court in the liability action had no authority to hear 
the issues relating to the recovery of PIP amounts. This Court in Street held 
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that perhaps if a benefit was rendered by this mistake, the insurer should con-
tribute towards payment of attorney's fees, provided the other condition (herein-
after discussed) is met. 
The second condition imposed by those decisions is that appropriate 
findings of fact be made by the trial court concerning the propriety of an award 
of attorney's fees, and specifically concerning the existance of a benefit con-
ferred upon the insured and the existance of a "mistake" as discussed above. 
Street v. Farmers ..• , supra.; Guranty ••• v. Morris, supra. 
In the present action, an award of attorney's fees would be improper for 
the reason that no benfit was conferred upon Ohio Casualty, and even if there were 
such a benefit, any "mistake" was a unilateral mistake made by the attorneys for 
Mrs. Brundage, which unilateral mistake was made after said attorneys were made 
fully aware of the applicable issues and posture of Ohio Casualty. From the begin-
ning Ohio Casualty informed the attorneys for Mrs. Brundage that Ohio Casualty in ten· 
ded to look to arbitration procedures, as set forth in the No-Fault Act, for recover) 
of the PIP benefits, and that said attorneys were not to represent the interests of 
Ohio Casualty. 
In the present action, no benfit was received by Ohio Casualty for the 
reason that the liability of the tort-feasor was clear, or, at least any question 
concerning liability was insignificant. 
The important point, however, is that according to Ivie, Mrs. Brundage 
and her attorneys had no right to assert the claims for recovery of PIP benefits 
and, in fact were specifically informed not to assert them. 
Again, Ohio Casualty accurately interpreted the No-Fault Act in so 
acting, and Ohio Casualty should not now be penalized merely because the other 
parties to this action failed properly to so interpret. Ohio Casualty could have 
done nothing more than it already had done to protect its interests and preserve 
its rights, and it should not now be penalized for mistakes of others. 
_Q_ 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF 
DISMISSAL IN FAVOR OF ALLSTATE. 
The trial court has discretion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(7), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, to grant relief from any final judgment or order for any 
reason justifying such relief. The Utah Supreme Court has held on various 
occasions that it will not reverse the trial court where it appears that the 
trial court was in possession of the relevant facts and considered those facts 
merely because the motion could have been granted, and has further stated that 
it will not substitute its discretion for that of the trial court. Warren v. 
Dixon Ranch Company, 123 U.416 260 p.2d 741; Mayhew v Standard Gilsonite 
Company, 14 U.2d 52,376 P.2d 951. 
This court has further stated that the provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) 
are sufficiently broad to permit a trial court to set aside its former order which 
appeared to be entered upon an erroneous assumption. Stewart v. Sullivan 29 U.2d 
156, 506 P.2d 74 (1973). 
It is generally understood that there is no such vested right in a 
judgment as to preclude a re-examination and a setting aside of the judgment 
according to established statutory procedures and it is also a well recognized 
rule that a judgment may be set aside or corrected when it is based upon a 
judgment which is subsequently reversed, especially in the event where there exists 
considerable equity or extreme hardship. 46 AmJur 2d Judgments Section 768. 
As has been previously indicated, the present case presents some un-
usual circumstances for the reason that the law in this area was in a state of 
uncertainty at the time of the original decision when the trial court dismissed 
Allstate from the present action. The fact that the law was in a state of un-
certainty was recognized by all of the parties to this action. Specifically 
all of said parties were aware of the fact that the Utah Supreme Court was pre-
-9-
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sently considering the Ivie case at the time of the prosecution of the subject 
action. Although it is not a part of the record, this author would represent 
that a verbal agreement existed between the parties to this case that a trial 
date would not be requested until after resolution of the Ivie case. In other 
words, contrary to the assertion made in Appellant's Brief, all the relevant 
facts and law supporting Plaintiff's claim were not known at the time the trial 
court entered said Order of Dismissal. 
The three month time limit imposed by Rule 60(b) with respect to certain 
grounds asserted to set aside a judgment does not apply with respect to motions 
made under Rule 60(b)(7) motions. In such cases the Rule states that the motion 
shall be made within a resonable time. Plaintiff-Respondent asserts that a 
determination of what constitutes a "reasonable time" must be determined in 
light of all existing circumstances. 
The court at the time of the hearing on the motion to set aside the judg-
ment of dismissal was made aware of all the existing facts including the then 
recently decided case of Ivie. After a full consideration of these issues, the 
trial court exercised its discretion and set aside the judgment of dismissal, 
and that order should not now be reversed. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT ALLSTATE OWES RESPONDENT OHIO CASUALTY THE AMOUNT OF 
$6,583.08 TOGETHER WITH STATUTORY INTEREST 
The trial court has set aside the judgment of dismissal as to Allstate 
and has subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Ohio Casualty, and 
accordingly the trial court has ordered Allstate to submit to binding arbitration• 
Ohio Casualty asserts that any outstanding issue with respect to the liability of 
Allstate to Ohio Casualty and the amount of the claim owed to Ohio Casualty have 
now been determined by the trial court in the underlying tort action; and need not 
now be the subject of review by any arbitration conunittee. 
Section 31-41-11, Utah Code Annotated requires as follows: 
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Every insurer authorized to write the insurance required by 
this act shall agree as a condition to being allowed to con-
tinue to write insurance in the state of Utah: 
(a) That where its insured is or would be held legally 
liable for the personal injuries by any person to whom benefits 
required under this act have been paid by another insurer, in-
cluding the state insurance fund, it will reimburse such other 
insurer for the payment of such benefits, but not in excess of 
the amount of damages so recoverable, (Emphasis added) and 
(b) That the issue of liability for such reimbursement 
and the amount of same shall be decided by mandatory, binding 
arbitration between the insurers. 
Respondent Ohio Casualty asserts that these issues have been decided 
in as much as the trial court in the case of Brundage vs. Kernan determined liabil-
ity and the amount of special damages (Reduced by 20% fault attributable to 
Brundage) in the sum of $6,538.08, and that this determination by the said trial 
court is res judicata as to the issue of liability and amount of damages as between 
Allstate and Ohio Casualty. 
By reason of the judgment rendered in the case of Brundage vs. Kernan 
Plaintiff-Respondent Ohio Casualty is entitled to recover statutory interest from 
Allstate from the date of the decision in September, 1977, at the rate of 12% per 
annum. Respondent-Ohio Casualty asserts that the liability of Allstate to Ohio 
Casualty was determined as of the date of the judgment in the lower court decision 
of Brundage vs. Kernan, and furthermore that the amount due was determined at that 
time. By reason thereof, Allstate is liable for the interest accruing on said 
amount from the date of said judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent-Ohio Casualty has acted, at all times, timely and in good 
faith and properly in protecting its interest to reimbursment of PIP benefits 
paid to its insured. From the beginning, Respondent-Ohio Casualty properly 
interpreted the applicable statute that set forth its right to recover PIP 
benefits paid through binding arbitration. Accordingly, it notified its insured 
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through her attorneys that they need not represent the interests of Ohio Casualty 
in the liability action. Furthermore, Ohio Casualty acted timely to give notice 
to Allstate of its subrogation claims and of its intentions to seek redress through 
direct reimbursement or the arbitration process. 
Despite these good faith efforts on the part of Respondent-Ohio Casualty, 
Allstate joined in a motion with Brundage's attorneys at the conclusion of the trial 
of Brundage vs. Kernan, that the sums representing Ohio Casualty's PIP payments be 
paid directly to Mrs. Brundage and her attorneys instead of being remitted from the 
judgment. Allstate should not now be heard to complain that this payment constitues 
a double recovery on the part of Mrs. Brundage. 
The trial court at the hearing on Respondent-Ohio Casualty's motion to 
set aside the earlier judgment of dismissal in favor of Allstate, was fully informed 
relative to the legal and factual issues presented, and properly exercised its dis-
cretion in setting aside the judgment of dismissal. Appellant Allstate should now 
submit to binding arbitration with respect to issues of liability of the respective 
drivers and the amount of PIP benefits. Furthermore, in the interests of judicial 
efficiency, this court should determine that Appellant Allstate is presently bound 
by the Brundage vs. Kernan decision concerning liability of Allstate to Ohio 
Casualty, and the amounts owed together with statutory interest. 
DATED this 15th day of September, 1982. 
-12-
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